Here is a summary of the key points about evidence from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on evidence:

• Evidence is central to epistemology and philosophy of science. It is what justifies belief and allows us to arrive at truth.

• There are different conceptions of evidence. Traditional epistemology holds that evidence consists of one's experiences or sense data that one has immediate access to. Logical positivists viewed evidence as observation statements. For Bayesians, evidence is what affects probabilities.

• Evidence should make beliefs more justified and bring them in line with the facts. Rational thinkers respect evidence and allow it to guide their beliefs.

• Evidence indicates or points to the truth. It serves as a guide, making some claims more likely to be true. Verification and falsification are limiting cases where evidence conclusively establishes truth or falsity.

• Evidence plays an arbitrating role between theories and facilitates intersubjective agreement among inquirers. It is objective and public rather than private or subjective.

• There are debates about whether evidence must be shareable and accessible to multiple observers to count as genuine evidence. Introspective evidence suggests not all evidence meets this criterion.

• The theory-ladenness critique argues adherents of rival theories will describe the same evidence differently. But evidence still sometimes successfully arbitrates between theories.

• Overall, evidence justifies belief, indicates truth, allows consensus, and facilitates objective knowledge. But there are disputes about its nature and role.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on evidence does not explicitly discuss the distinction between criterial (or constitutive) evidence versus non-criterial (or inductive) evidence.

However, it does touch on some relevant ideas:

• It notes that evidence can play a justifying role, making beliefs more reasonable or justified. This relates to the idea of criterial evidence, which is conceptual and definitively establishes some claim.

• It discusses how evidence can make a hypothesis more likely to be true. This connects more to non-criterial or inductive evidence, which provides probabilistic support.

• It examines the role of evidence in verification and falsification. Verification (conclusively confirming a claim) aligns with the notion of criterial evidence, while falsification relates more to inductive evidence.

• The entry covers the theory-ladenness critique, which argues that evidence may be described differently by those with different theoretical commitments. This could connect to criterial versus non-criterial evidence.

So in summary, the entry does not directly contrast criterial and non-criterial evidence, but it does cover ideas relevant to this distinction in its analysis of the nature and roles of evidence. The distinction is not a major focus of the article though.